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I.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY AMERICANS AND THE 
FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 
With over 11,000 investment advisers and 5,100 broker-dealers 
managing $38 trillion in retail and institutional accounts,1 millions of 
Americans rely on financial services providers to navigate their 
investments.2  While their reliance is based on each provider’s knowledge 
and expertise, many Americans look to their individual service provider as 
 
 1. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS: AS 
REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER 
DEALERS], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf. 
 2. Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 55 VILL. 
L. REV. 701, 701 (2010).  Financial services providers “offer advice regarding retirement accounts, 
college savings plans, and other means through which individuals and families save for their future.”  
Id.  Nearly seventy-five percent of Americans engaged with these providers receive advisory, 
management, or planning services.  ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY 
PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 90 (2008) [hereinafter INVESTOR 
AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
1_randiabdreport.pdf.  This same portion of Americans use providers “for conducting stock market 
or mutual fund transactions.”  Id. 
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more than a tactical expert—their provider is a source of trust and 
confidence.3  In the wake of recent corporate scandal and investor fraud,4 the 
delicate relationship between financial services providers and their clients 
“ha[s] led the public to view the financial service industry with more 
skepticism.  It is an industry based on trust, and many [individuals] . . . d[o] 
not trust the industry.”5 
While both financial investment advisers and broker-dealers are 
considered financial services providers, there are tangible differences 
between the two.6  The 1934 Securities Exchange Act (“1934 Act”) defines 
broker-dealers as individuals who execute securities transactions.7  Their 
 
 3. According to a focus group conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), 
“[t]rust of the individual financial service professional was the most cited feature of what investors 
would be looking for in a financial service provider.  Trust of the individual professional was cited 
as more important than trust of the firm for which that individual works.”  INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 107.  In fact, “[p]articipants felt that the personal relationship is very 
important.”  Id. 
 4. Two recent scandals include the collapse of corporate giants WorldCom and Enron, both of 
whose underhanded accounting and trading practices led to financial ruin.  See Zubin Jelveh & Karl 
Russell, The Rise and Fall of Enron, N.Y. TIMES, 2006, 
www.nytimes.com/ref/business/20060201_ENRON_GRAPHIC.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2014); 
Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom’s Collapse: The Overview; WorldCom for Bankruptcy; 
Largest U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 22, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/us/worldcom-s-
collapse-the-overview-worldcom-files-for-bankruptcy-largest-us-case.html.  The SEC filed a civil 
complaint against telecommunications giant WorldCom for manipulating earnings to “keep profits in 
line with Wall Street expectations,” inaccurately reporting $3.8 billion in illusory earnings.  SEC 
Files Civil Fraud Complaint Against WorldCom: SEC v. WorldCom Inc., 8 No. 14 ANDREWS SEC. 
LITIG. & REG. REP. 9, 9 (2002).   
  Similarly, Enron Corporation, a United States energy-trading and utilities company, engaged 
in complex trading with buyers and sellers in “a hybrid of traditional [securities] exchanges.”  Lucky 
Shackelford et al., Special Report: Enron Probe, Rising Power, WASH. POST, 2002, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/enron/.  The company was ultimately exposed for 
overstating $586 million in earnings, leaving Enron liable for up to $3 billion in outstanding 
obligations.  Id.  Thousands of Enron employees and retirees lost their life savings while investors 
watched the corporation’s stock lose billions of dollars in value.  Id. 
 5. INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE, supra note 2, at 107; see also Andrew R. Simank, 
Deliberately Defrauding Investors: The Scope of Liability, 42 ST. MARY’S L. J. 253, 254 (2010) 
(“The Enron scandal, along with similar corporate collapses that have followed in its wake, exposed 
the distrust and corruption prevalent in the United States’ securities market.  Since the Enron 
debacle, shareholders and investors have increasingly filed suit in state and federal courts to recoup 
financial losses resulting from fraudulent representations made by failing corporations.”). 
 6. Despite their differences, approximately eighteen percent of registered broker-dealers are 
also registered as investment advisers.  STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS, 
supra note 1, at iii.  
 7. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2012); see also 
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duties include performing research, providing advice, and maintaining 
customer funds.8  Broker-dealers’ firms are regulated under the 1934 Act 
and are subject to the rules and penalties mandated by the Financial Industry 
Regulation Authority (“FINRA”),9 a self-regulatory organization that 
enforces rules, disciplines malfeasance, detects and prevents wrongdoing, 
and educates and informs investors.10  In contrast, investment advisers are 
governed by the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“1940 Act”).11  The 1940 
Act defines an investment adviser as “any person who, for compensation, 
engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through 
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability 
of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities.”12  It is the difference 
between offering continuous financial advice and providing commission-
based transactional services that distinguishes broker-dealers from 
investment advisers.13  
A more striking difference between broker-dealers and investment 
advisers is the extent of their fiduciary duties to their clients.  Broker-dealers 
are not held to a formal fiduciary duty.14  Rather, they are subject to a 
suitability standard,15 which prohibits engaging in manipulative, deceptive, 
 
Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisers—What’s in a Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 36 
(2005) (quoting 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424 at 20,431 (Apr. 19, 2005)). 
 8. Black, supra note 7, at 36. 
 9. Laby, supra note 2, at 702. 
 10. About FINRA: What We Do, FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, 
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/WhatWeDo/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2014). 
 11. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012). 
 12. Id.; see also Peter Isakoff, Agents of Change: The Fiduciary Duties of Forwarding Market 
Professionals, 61 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1568–69 (2012) (highlighting the differences between broker-
dealers and investment advisers). 
 13. Isakoff, supra note 12, at 1569.   
 14. Black, supra note 7, at 36 (“A broker-dealer’s relationship with his customers is not, 
however, generally considered a fiduciary one, unless the broker exercises investment discretion 
over the customer’s account . . . they are [also] not bound by the fiduciary prohibition on self-dealing 
transactions without the principal’s informed consent.”).   
 15. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) Rule 2111 establishes the suitability 
standard and requires broker-dealers to make reasonable efforts to discover the client’s “age, other 
investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, investment objectives investment experience, 
investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance, and any other information the customer may 
disclose . . .  in connection with such [suitability] recommendation.”  FINRA Manual, FINRA Rule 
2111 (eff. Feb. 4, 2013), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859; see also STUDY 
ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS, supra note 1, at iv (identifying that the 
suitability standard “generally requires a broker-dealer to make recommendations that are consistent 
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or fraudulent transactional behavior.16 
In contrast, investment advisers do have fiduciary obligations to their 
clients under section 201 of the 1940 Act.17  While broker-dealers are, in 
fact, governed by this Act, section 201 explicitly exempts them from 
fiduciary obligations so long as they exercise appropriate discretion and do 
not receive “special compensation.”18  Congress’s rationale for this exclusion 
lies in a desire to prevent broker-dealers from being doubly regulated under 
both the 1934 Act and the 1940 Act.19  However, subsequent technological 
advances eroded the relevance of this policy by decreasing broker-dealers’ 
transactional roles and increasing their advice and strategy functions—
functions that were traditionally reserved for investment advisers.20 
As the distinctions between investment advisers and broker-dealers 
continue to blur, “retail customers today see little difference between a 
broker and an adviser.”21  Their confusion is warranted in that approximately 
forty percent of all broker-dealers are in control of, or associated with, an 
 
with the interests of its customer”). 
 16. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(c)(1)-(2); see also Isakoff, supra note 12, at 1571.  A 
broker-dealer’s obligations, detailed in Rule 10b-10, are limited to disclosure of the date and time of 
the transaction, his roles as agent or principal, information pertaining to odd-lot differentials, and 
statements of debt security, among others.  SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-10 (2005).   
 17. Black, supra note 7, at 38 (“It is well established that the relationship between an investment 
adviser and his customer is a fiduciary one . . . [B]ecause he is a fiduciary, an investment adviser 
cannot, either as a principal or broker, knowingly engage in a securities transaction with a client 
unless he discloses in writing to the client the capacity in which he is acting and obtains the client’s 
consent to the transaction, prior to completion of the transaction.”); see also Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (finding that there is 
a “delicate fiduciary nature [in] an investment advisory relationship”). 
 18. A broker-dealer providing investment advice to a consumer is not subject to the 1940 Act if 
the advice is “solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives 
no special compensation therefore.”  Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
2(a)(11) (2012).  Furthermore, an investment advisor “does not include . . . any broker dealer whose 
performance of such services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer 
and who receives no special compensation therefor,” Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 
202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C). 
 19. Isakoff, supra note 12, at 1569–70. 
 20. Id. at 1570; see also supra notes 6–13 and accompanying text. 
 21. Laby, supra note 2, at 702; see also Gary A. Varnavides, The Flawed State of Broker-Dealer 
Regulation and the Case for an Authentic Federal Fiduciary Standard for Broker-Dealers, 16 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 215 (2011) (“[T]he contemporary distinction between broker-
dealers and investment advisers is complex and increasingly blurred . . . [given that] they ‘provide 
practically indistinguishable services to retail investors and direct them to the same [financial] 
products.’”) (internal citation omitted). 
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investment firm that performs advisory services.22  The blurred roles of 
broker-dealers and investment advisers have also bred a high degree of 
mistrust among American investors given recent scandals surrounding 
Bernard Madoff’s billion-dollar Ponzi scheme and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s Goldman Sachs investigation.23  It is therefore 
necessary to re-visit broker-dealers’ fiduciary obligations and establish a 
uniform standard throughout the financial services industry.24   
II.  AN IMPETUS FOR CHANGE 
As mastermind of the world’s largest Ponzi scheme, Bernard Madoff 
lost $50 billion of individual, corporate, and nonprofit investments through 
fraudulent and manipulative tactics.25  The investment giant applied a 
mysterious black box model of buying and selling and used his hedge fund 
to orchestrate “a facade of profitability” that convinced thousands of 
Americans to entrust their life savings to his hedge fund, Ascot Partners.26  
Broker-dealers perpetuated the façade by directing client funds to Ascot 
Partners despite having knowledge of its fraudulent characteristics.27  
Among the implicated broker-dealers was Fairfield Greenwich Group, 
which “allegedly received coaching from Madoff to avoid Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) inquiries and had possessed at least 
constructive knowledge—if not actual knowledge—of Madoff’s illegal 
 
 22. Varnavides, supra note 21, at 216 (“[I]t is unsurprising that ‘the typical retail investor finds it 
difficult to understand the nature of the business’ that is providing them with investment advisory or 
brokerage services.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 23. See infra notes 25–38 and accompanying text; see generally Simank, supra note 5, at 253 
(discussing the impact of fraud, Ponzi schemes, federal investigations, and corporate scandal on 
Americans’ opinions of the financial services industry); 
 24. Thomas Lee Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker Standards Sufficient?  Principles, Rules, and 
Fiduciary Duties, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 710, 712 (2010) [hereinafter Hazen, Existing Stock 
Broker Standards] (emphasizing that “the extent to which broker-dealers are or should be subject to 
fiduciary duties is another issue that has been at the forefront due to recent financial events”). 
 25. Robert Lenzner, Bernie Madoff’s $50 Billion Ponzi Scheme, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2008, 6:45 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/12/madoff-ponzi-hedge-pf-ii-in_rl_1212croesus_inl.html; see 
also Diana Henriques, Madoff Fraud Rippled Around the World, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21iht-madoff.4.18852346.html?page 
wanted=all&_r=0 (describing the magnitude of the Madoff fraud, which scammed international 
investors throughout Europe and East Asia as well as domestic institutions like the North Shore-
Long Island Jewish Health System, Yeshiva University, and New York Law School). 
 26. Isakoff, supra note 12, at 1564; Lenzner, supra note 25. 
 27. Isakoff, supra note 12, at 1565.  
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Ponzi scheme.”28  Moreover, even though Fairfield became Madoff’s 
primary feeder,29 its brokers failed to notify their clients of Fairfield’s 
decision to invest in Madoff’s hedge fund.30  Such conduct illustrates the 
need to reevaluate broker-dealers’ fiduciary obligations, since none of 
Fairfield’s actions were outwardly prohibited by the 1934 Act’s due 
diligence standard.31  Thus, Fairfield escaped without penalty and settled all 
claims without having to admit to wrongdoing or to breaching a duty of care 
to its clients.32 
Similarly, the SEC investigated the multinational investment banking 
firm Goldman Sachs for fabricating derivative instruments33 and trading 
ahead of, and adversely to, its own clients.34  In its claim, the SEC alleged 
that: 
Goldman and Tourre, in the offer or sale of securities or securities-
based swap agreements, by the use of means or instruments of 
interstate commerce or by the mails, directly or indirectly (a) 
employed devices, schemes or artifices to defraud; (b) obtained 
money or property by means of untrue statements . . . made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading; or (c) engaged in transactions, practices, or courses of 
business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon 
purchasers of securities.35 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Henriques, supra note 25. 
 30. Isakoff, supra note 12, at 1565. 
 31. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2006)); see also Isakoff, supra note 12, at 1565. 
 32. Isakoff, supra note 12, at 1565; see also In re Fairfield Greenwich Advisors LLC, No. 2009-
0028, 2009 WL 3157459, at *1 (Mass. Sec. Div. Sept. 8, 2009). 
 33. Hazen, Existing Stock Broker Standards, supra note 24, at 712–13.  A derivative instrument 
is “a financial instrument whose value depends on some underlying financial asset, commodity index 
or predefined variable.”  Glossary of Statistical Terms: Derivative Instrument, ORGANISATION FOR 
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (Mar. 3, 2003), 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=601. 
 34. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Goldman Acknowledges Conflicts with Clients, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 
2010, 11:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/01/12/goldman-executive-discloses-conflicts-
policy/ (“In one such situation . . . Goldman created and sold bundles of mortgages known as 
collateralized debt obligations while at the same time selling them short.”). 
 35. Complaint ¶ 69, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F.Supp.2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 
1:10-CV-03229), 2010 WL 1508202. 
[Vol. 2014: 1, 2014] Restoring Confidence in the Financial Services Industry 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
7 
Despite evidence of fraud and deceit, the court failed to clarify 
Goldman’s obligations to its clients.36  Thus, the litigation and final 
settlement of the case left scholars questioning how to prevent such a 
massive ethical violation—should the industry impose legal formalities by 
means of formal rules similar to other federal securities laws, or should the 
industry turn to the gap-filling standard of fiduciary duties?37  At the core of 
the Goldman Sachs dispute was a changing standard for trust-based 
relationships in the financial industry—a standard that must be addressed 
before another scandal deprives Americans of their financial security.38 
Imposing fiduciary obligations on broker-dealers in the same way these 
obligations apply to investment advisers would begin to restore investors’ 
trust in the financial services industry.  At common law, relationships were 
fiduciary when one party’s knowledge far outweighed that of a beneficiary 
whose reliance on said expertise necessitated an ethical safeguard.39  Thus, a 
fiduciary was obligated to uphold and respect the beneficiary’s trust in his 
extensive knowledge and skill.40  However, “[t]he fiduciary’s duties go 
beyond mere fairness and honesty; they oblige him to act to further the 
beneficiary’s best interests.  The fiduciary must avoid acts that put his 
interests in conflict with the beneficiary’s. . . . [T]he fiduciary must be 
candid and must evince utmost good faith.”41   
These traits—honesty, trust, and good faith—speak to the nature of a 
 
 36. Hazen, Existing Stock Broker Standards, supra note 24, at 713 (citing Litigation Release No. 
21592: Securities and Exchange Commission v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Fabrice Tourre, Civil 
Action No. 10 Civ. 3229 (July 15, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21592.htm); see Patricia Hurtado & Christine 
Harper, SEC Settlement with Goldman Sachs for $550 Million Approved by U.S. Judge, 
BLOOMBERG, (July 21, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-20/goldman-sachs-
settlement-with-sec-for-550-million-approved-by-u-s-judge.html. 
 37. Steven M. Davidoff et al., The SEC v. Goldman Sachs: Reputation, Trust, and Fiduciary 
Duties in Investment Banking, 37 J. CORP. L. 529, 541 (2012).  The SEC’s complaint “appeared to 
be applying the rule to enforce a trust-like relationship among Goldman Sachs and its counterparties 
analogous to a fiduciary duty-type relationship.”  Id. at 532.  For a more extensive discussion of 
rules and principles, see infra notes 61–66 and accompanying text. 
 38. Davidoff, supra note 37, at 541. 
 39. Hazen, Existing Stock Broker Standards, supra note 24, at 723–24. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE 
L.J. 879, 882 (1988); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1979) (“A fiduciary 
relation exists between two persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice for 
the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation.”). 
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broker-dealer’s relationship with his clients.42  Not only does a broker-dealer 
recommend well-researched and suitable stock, he has a duty to expedite 
orders, disclose trading risks, avoid conflicts of interest, refrain from 
material misrepresentations, and receive customer authorization.43  The 
parallels between these obligations and the obligations traditionally assigned 
to fiduciaries suggest that heightened duties should extend not only to 
investment advisers, but to broker-dealers as well.  After all, the Goldman 
Sachs investigation was grounded in the very fraud, deceit, and distrust that 
the common law fiduciary duty sought to avoid.44  When evaluated alongside 
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme and the scandals at WorldCom and Enron,45 the 
industry’s recent history illustrates the need for a standard that restores trust, 
loyalty, and confidence in the financial market.46  As former SEC Chairman 
Mary Schapiro emphasized, “Too many financial institutions, securities 
firms, mortgage originators and credit rating agencies . . . . simply ignored 
the risks they were tasked with identifying. . . . So now we’re all trying to 
find our way back—back to a place where investors have faith . . . .”47 
III.  THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
In response to the aforementioned investment scandals and the financial 
crisis of 2008, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”).48  The Dodd-Frank Act is 
“the most comprehensive financial regulatory reform measure[] taken since 
the Great Depression,”49 mandating changes in the supervision, 
 
 42. Hazen, Existing Stock Broker Standards, supra note 24, at 748. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text. 
 45. For more detail on the WorldCom and Enron scandals, see supra note 4. 
 46. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text. 
 47. Mary Schapiro, Chairman, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Speech: The 
Road to Investor Confidence (Oct. 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch102709mls.htm. 
 48. Hazen, Existing Stock Broker Standards, supra note 24, at 714–15; see also Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) 
(codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); Thomas Lee Hazen, Stock Broker Fiduciary Duties 
and the Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 47, 47 (2011) [hereinafter Hazen, 
Stock Broker Fiduciary Duties] (noting that the Dodd-Frank Act was “cobbled together” as a 
compromise bill).  
 49. MORRISON & FOERSTER, THE DODD-FRANK ACT: A CHEAT SHEET 2–25 (2010), available at 
http://www.mofo.com/files/uploads/images/summarydoddfrankact.pdf. 
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responsibility, regulation, and governance of financial institutions, credit 
ratings agencies, and compensation practices.50  Specific to investor 
protection, section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act gives the SEC rulemaking 
authority to impose a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers.51  Thus, while the Act 
itself does not impose a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers, it does permit the 
SEC to do so.52  The Dodd-Frank Act has thereby ignited a national 
discussion about the merits of pursuing such a mandate.53  It is a discussion 
made more complex given the Act’s additional provision that: 
[I]nvestment advisers providing personalized investment advice to 
retail customers may be required to act in the best interest of the 
customer without regard to the financial or other interest of the 
adviser providing the advice.  The SEC rulemaking authority also . . 
. . require[s] material conflicts of interest to be disclosed and 
consented to by the customer. . . . [T]he SEC’s rulemaking authority 
over broker-dealers [also] now includes the ability to adopt rules to 
require that  broker-dealers who sell proprietary or a limited range 
of products provide notice to the customer and obtain the 
customer’s consent or acknowledgment.54 
Notably, the majority of these provisions are already mandated by the 
1940 Act;55 accordingly, they serve as mere reminders to SEC rule-makers 
 
 50. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).  For a more comprehensive 
summary of the Act, see THE DODD-FRANK ACT: A CHEAT SHEET, supra note 49, at 2–25, which 
independently overviews the details of the Act’s financial stability reform, agencies and agency 
oversight reform, securitization reform, derivatives regulation, investor protection reform, credit 
rating agency reform, the Volker Rule provision, compensation and corporate governance, and 
capital requirements. 
 51. Dodd-Frank Act, § 913, 124 Stat. 1824–1830, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 80b-11 (2012); see also 
Hazen, Existing Stock Broker Standards, supra note 24, at 715 (“For instance, the Commission may 
choose to issue a rule which places on broker-dealers who give investment advice to retail clients the 
same fiduciary duty as that currently placed on investment advisers under the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940.”). 
 52. See Hazen, Existing Stock Broker Standards, supra note 24, at 717 (“The Act also provides 
that the SEC may choose to create a rule requiring broker-dealers offering personalized investment 
advice to retail customers to act in the best interest of the customer, as well as requiring broker-
dealers to disclose certain conflicts of interest.”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Hazen, Stock Broker Fiduciary Duties, supra note 48, at 48–49. 
 55. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012); see 
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that the trust and confidence inherent to an investment adviser or broker-
dealer’s relationship with his client demands a heightened duty of reliability 
and loyalty. 
Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act further mandates that the SEC 
conduct a study of broker-client relationships prior to engaging in 
rulemaking.56  Consequently, the Investor Advisory Committee completed a 
study assessing “the effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory standards of 
care” among broker-dealers.57  As prescribed, the study addressed fourteen 
considerations encompassing the following topics: confusion between 
investment advisers and broker-dealers, enforcement resources, the potential 
impact of changing regulatory requirements and/or eliminating the broker-
dealer exclusion from the 1940 Act, and the cost of altering regulatory 
requirements.58  Six months of analysis led the SEC to make the following 
recommendation: 
The Commission should exercise its rulemaking authority to 
implement the uniform fiduciary standard of conduct for broker-
dealers and investment advisers when providing personalized 
investment advice about securities to retail customers.  Specifically, 
the Staff recommends that the uniform fiduciary standard of 
conduct established by the Commission should provide that:  
[T]he standard of conduct for all brokers, dealers, and investment 
advisers, when providing personalized investment advice about 
securities to retail customers (and such other customers as the 
Commission may by rule provide), shall be to act in the best interest 
of the customer without regard to the financial or other interest of 
the broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing the advice.59 
This recommendation is consistent with the opinions advanced by The 
 
also 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11(g)(2012). 
 56. Dodd-Frank Act, § 913, 124 Stat. 1824-30.  
 57. Id. §§ 913(b)(1); see also, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS, supra 
note 1, at i; (“Retail investors generally are not aware of these differences [between broker-dealers 
and investment advisers] or their legal implications. . . . [I[nvestor confusion has been a source of 
concern for regulators . . . .”). 
 58. See generally STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS, supra note 1. 
 59. Id. at vi. 
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Committee for the Fiduciary Standard,60 former SEC Chairman Mary 
Schapiro,61 and FINRA Chairman Richard Ketchum,62 all of whom 
recognize that the ambiguity of broker-dealer obligations obstructs the trust, 
loyalty, and confidence necessary to a thriving securities industry.63 
IV.  ADVOCATING FOR A UNIFORM, RULES-BASED FIDUCIARY STANDARD 
Despite the SEC’s recommendation that broker-dealers be held to a 
uniform fiduciary standard, such a standard has yet to be imposed.64  This 
delay is, for the most part, due to an ongoing debate about the need to 
supplement general principles-based regulations with specific rules-based 
standards.65  The debate implicates the troublesome reality that fiduciary 
duties in the financial services industry uniquely possess both principle- and 
rule-like attributes.66  While most broker-dealer regulations “ultimately 
derive from principles that predate U.S. federal securities acts,” disclosure 
laws—as well as other fiduciary regulations—are often more rules-centric.67  
It is thus logical that stricter fiduciary standards should derive from specific 
rules-based standards that outline industry expectations for broker-dealers.68  
 
 60. See Why did The Committee for the Fiduciary Standard form and what is its objective?, THE 
COMMITTEE FOR THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD (2013), http://www.thefiduciarystandard.org/about-us/. 
 61. See Schapiro, supra note 47. 
 62. See Kathleen M. McBride, FINRA’s Ketchum Speaks of Fiduciary Duty, THINK ADVISOR 
(Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2009/10/29/finras-ketchum-speaks-of-fiduciary-duty.  
 63. Scholars suggest that the ambiguity inherent to broker-dealer obligations is not only a 
product of the different standards imposed on broker-dealers and investment advisers, but is also 
attributable to a paucity of litigated cases, high settlement rates, contractual variation, and 
differences in state law.  Laby, supra note 2, at 705–15. 
 64. See Hazen, Stock Broker Fiduciary Duties, supra note 48, at 56–57. 
 65. See id.  In general, “[p]rovisions characterized by generality, abstractness, or universality are 
principles, while those that are specific, concrete, and particular are rules.” Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate 
Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1420 (2007).   
 66. Cunningham, supra note 65, at 1414.  In securities regulation, the difference between rules 
and principles is largely temporal: Rules define boundaries for future behavior and principles 
evaluate behavior that has already occurred.  Id. at 1420.  It is impossible to categorize the entirety 
of securities regulation as either principles-based or rules-based given the complexity of the financial 
services industry.  Id. at 1449–51. 
 67. This is due to the specificity of timing, filing, and content requirements of current disclosure 
laws.  Id. at 1448–49.   
 68. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.  Critics suggest that fiduciary regulations 
should remain grounded in principle-based standards because strict rule-based regulation risks 
“evasion by being too inflexible to catch newly conceived schemes.”  Cunningham, supra note 65, at 
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Doing so will ameliorate the adverse effects of recent financial crises, 
namely a diminished standard of investor care, disregard of investment 
advice as a professional service, and negative perceptions of financial 
intermediaries.69 
The Committee for a Fiduciary Standard recommends that the following 
five principles govern the uniform fiduciary standard:  
 
[1] Put the client’s best interests first 
[2] Act with prudence; that is, with the skill, care, diligence and 
good judgment of a professional 
[3] Do not mislead clients; provide conspicuous, full and fair 
disclosure of all important facts 
[4] Avoid conflicts of interest; and  
[5] Fully disclose and fairly manage, in the client’s favor, 
unavoidable conflicts.70 
Together, these principles reflect the exact policy that informed the 1940 
Act’s mandate for investment advisers’ fiduciary duties: that the potential 
for detrimental self-dealing warranted a heightened standard of duty and 
obligation.71 
The risk of detrimental self-dealing has increased given that the 
distinctions between advice-based investment advisers and transaction-based 
broker-dealers continue to blur.72  Because investors now rely on both 
investment advisers and broker-dealers for advice and recommendations, the 
SEC needs to adopt a uniform standard to protect them.  Moreover, 
investors’ reliance is reinforced by the fact that broker-dealers hold 
themselves out as having a degree of expertise implicative of loyalty, 
 
1424.  However, the current scheme of principles-based regulation has been vulnerable to schemes 
like those perpetrated by Enron, WorldCom, and Bernard Madoff, none of whom were deterred or 
reprimanded under existing regulatory principles.  See supra notes 4, 25–47 and accompanying text. 
 69. See Blaine F. Aikin, How a ‘universal’ fiduciary standard would change how financial 
advisers do business, INVESTMENT NEWS (May 10, 2009, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article /20090510 /REG/305109993#. 
 70. THE COMMITTEE FOR THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD, supra note 60.  
 71. The 1940 Act imposed a fiduciary obligation on investment advisers because their “basic 
function . . . is grounded in ‘furnishing to clients on a personal basis competent, unbiased and 
continuous advice regarding the sound management of their investments.’”  Black, supra note 7, at 
38 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 187 (1963)).   
 72. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
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competence, and equitable conduct.73  Therefore, investor interests should 
govern securities regulation because it is they who fully rely on broker-
dealers’ knowledge and expertise.74  The present suitability standard to 
which broker-dealers are held is thereby insufficient because it improperly 
prioritizes broker-dealer interests over investor interests.75   
As of November 22, 2013, the Investor Advisory Committee 
unanimously voted to send a uniform fiduciary standard proposal to the 
SEC.76  The decision to impose a uniform standard has been endorsed by 
SEC Commissioner Elisse Walter, who called the standard a “gold standard” 
because it “would require the same level of service from both brokers and 
investment advisors.”77  Despite Walter’s endorsement, industry groups and 
other stakeholders are wary of a new standard for fear of weakening 
investment advisers’ existing fiduciary obligations.78  Yet given that the new 
proposal is designed to protect investors by mandating a “stricter ethical 
 
 73. This concept of holding oneself out as an expert in the field is derived from the Shingle 
Theory, which the SEC first applied in addressing excessive broker-dealer markups.  See Charles 
Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437–38 (2d Cir. 1943) (determining that the broker-dealer had 
offered to act on the consumer’s behalf and should therefore be held to a higher standard of 
obligation); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cole, 457 A.2d 656, 664 (Conn. 1983) 
(“The ‘shingle’ theory . . . has become a well established doctrine in the securities field.”).  Because 
the Shingle Theory mandates a reasonableness standard, and not the standard of a fiduciary, this 
theory provides a conceptual foundation from which to derive a uniform fiduciary duty.  Laby, supra 
note 2, at 722.  
 74. See THE COMMITTEE FOR THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD, supra note 60. 
 75. Furthermore, “[i]f an investor is wronged by a broker, the burden is on the investor to prove 
the broker’s wrongdoing; if the investor is wronged by a fiduciary advisor, the burden is on the 
advisor to prove they acted in the client’s best interest.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 76. Matthias Rieker, Uniform Fiduciary Standard Proposal Sent to SEC, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 
2013, 12:44 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304337404579214043533487308. 
 77. Lorie Konish, SEC’s Walter Calls for Uniform Fiduciary Standard for Investment Industry, 
ON WALL STREET (May 20, 2013), http://www.onwallstreet.com/news/SEC-Commissioner-Elisse-
Walter-Uniform-Fiduciary-Standard-2684956-1.html.  This proposed standard expands disclosure 
requirements, requiring broker-dealers to disclose their method of compensation, limitations to their 
services, professional background, and disciplinary record.  Rieker, supra note 76.  Broker-dealers 
may also be required to provide clients with access to BrokerCheck and other credential, 
disciplinary, and employment information made public on FINRA’s website.  Id. 
 78. Maris Lokshin, Groups, Stakeholders Offer Mixed Views on Potential Uniform Standard for 
B-Ds, IAs, BLOOOMBERG LAW (2014), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/law-reports/groups-
stakeholders-offer-mixed-views-on-potential-uniform-standard-for-b-ds-ias/ (last visited Mar. 5, 
2014).  More specifically, a June 27, 2013 letter written to the SEC by the Massachusetts Secretary 
of the Commonwealth articulated concerns about watering down the current fiduciary standard under 
the 1940 Act.  Id.  
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standard” for broker-dealers, 79 the likelihood of decreasing advisers’ current 
fiduciary duties is minimal at best.  As SEC Chair Mary Jo White remarked, 
“‘Any time you have the same conduct regulated differently . . . you need to 
take a very close look at that and see what to do about it.’”80  The proposal 
seeks to do just this—remedy the inconsistencies in contemporary securities 
regulation.81  
At its core, the Investor Advisory Committee’s proposal focuses on 
“convey[ing] information to the investors so it doesn’t drown them in 
information.”82  It focuses on the best interests of the client.83  Since 
Americans’ general impression of the financial services industry is 
characterized by the fear of losing money, a lack of knowledge, and general 
mistrust of industry professionals,84 the Committee’s emphasis on clarity 
aims to ease the public’s qualms about the industry as a whole.   
Given that the 1940 Act defines investment advisers as individuals who, 
“for compensation, engage[] in the business of advising others . . . as to the 
value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or 
selling securities,”85 and that, today, “advice is an essential ingredient of a 
broker’s financial services,”86 broker-dealers should be held to a fiduciary 
standard that is identical to that of their investment adviser counterparts.  
After all, the purpose in adopting a fiduciary standard for any type of 
professional lies in his duty to act in the beneficiary’s best interest.87  Thus, 
broker-dealers should not be exempt from these heightened ethical 
obligations by virtue of their more frequent involvement in transactional 
 
 79.  Rieker, supra note 76. 
 80. Kelley Howes, Uniform Fiduciary Standard Still a Priority, But No Timeline Yet, THE BD/IA 
REGULATOR (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.bdiaregulator.com/2013/11/uniform-fiduciary-standard-
still-a-priority-but-no-timeline-yet/. 
 81. See Rieker, supra note 76.. 
 82. Id. 
 83. In response to criticism about the financial and regulatory impact of a uniform standard on 
industry professions, FINRA Chairman and CEO Richard Ketchum emphasized that “broker-dealers 
should worry less about the legal standard and focus more on acting in the best interest of clients.”  
Howes, supra note 80. 
 84. INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 103. 
 85. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012).  As previously 
established, investment advisers may be liable to their clients for negligent preparation or negligent 
interpretation of investment advice.  DeMott, supra note 41, at 906. 
 86. Laby, supra note 2, at 742. 
 87. DeMott, supra note 41, at 882. 
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work.88   
Furthermore, the fact that brokers now also perform advisory functions89 
should be dispositive in requiring of them the identical duties of trust, 
loyalty, and reliability that are expected elsewhere in the profession.  For in 
the aftermath of events like the Goldman Sachs investigation and Bernard 
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, what Americans need most is assurance that such 
mismanagement will never occur with their personal investments.90  
Imposing a uniform fiduciary standard for investment advisers and broker-
dealers will support a growing confidence in the financial marketplace, a 
confidence that is necessary not only for their personal growth, but also for 
the viability of the American financial industry as a whole.91 
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 88. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.  
 89. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
 90. See supra notes 25–38 and accompanying text.  
 91. See supra notes 39–47 and accompanying text. 
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